Israel’s sweeping intelligence operations against Iran have jolted Taiwan’s security community, raising concerns that Beijing could adopt similar tactics to cripple the island’s leadership or critical infrastructure.
As assassinations and sabotage rattle Tehran, analysts in Taipei warn that Beijing’s infiltration of Taiwan is no longer a purely political threat, and it might be laying the groundwork for high-stakes covert warfare.
In recent months, Taiwan has seen a surge in espionage cases implicating not only retired and active-duty military personnel, but also aides to senior government officials and lawmakers from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
The breadth and depth of these cases have sparked concerns that Beijing’s intelligence network has already penetrated the island’s political and defence systems.
“What Israel has done to Iran – through a combination of precision, infiltration, and intelligence dominance – is something Beijing could try to replicate,” said Max Lo, executive director of the Taiwan International Strategic Study Society. “The difference is, this time Taiwan may be the one under the microscope.”
According to experts, Taiwan’s vulnerabilities lie not only in its geographic proximity to mainland China but also in decades of cross-strait social and cultural exchange, which have enabled mainland Chinese intelligence operatives to blend in and recruit more easily.
“This makes China’s infiltration both easier and more difficult to detect, especially compared with how Iran is targeted,” said Zivon Wang, a military analyst at the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, a think tank in Taipei.
Among the most concerning recent cases are four former DPP aides charged with leaking sensitive information to Beijing – including aides tied to Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te, as well as National Security Council Secretary General Joseph Wu during his time as foreign minister from 2018 to 2024.
One of the four, Huang Chu-jung, was indicted last month for using an encrypted, off-market messaging app to relay high-level travel and campaign data directly to mainland Chinese handlers.
According to prosecutors, the compromised data included Lai’s full itinerary for his formal visit to Paraguay in August 2023 as the island’s second most senior official, as well as sensitive details from his presidential campaign later that year – raising serious concerns over Lai’s personal security.
Prosecutors alleged that Beijing also gained access to Lai’s schedule of unannounced meetings with political allies, business leaders and key influencers.
Analysts said the revelations showed Beijing had probably been cultivating a long-term espionage network capable of striking Taiwan’s command-and-control structure or vital infrastructure. This could include pre-positioned saboteurs embedded near critical assets such as military bases, power plants, radar stations, airports and cyber nodes, ready to act before or during a potential cross-strait conflict.
“What’s even more alarming is the possibility of a decapitation strike,” Wang said.
“If Beijing can obtain real-time intelligence on the movements of top leaders and military commanders, it could use that to disrupt or neutralise the chain of command at the outset of a conflict – damaging morale and potentially forcing a surrender.”
Beijing regards Taiwan as part of its territory and has not ruled out using force to bring the island under its control.
Since taking office as the island’s leader last year, Lai has called the mainland a “foreign hostile force” and said the two sides of the Taiwan Strait “are not subordinate to each other”. As a result, Beijing has intensified military activities near Taiwan to ramp up pressure on the island.
Like most countries, the United States does not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but it opposes any forcible change to the cross-strait status quo and is legally obliged under the Taiwan Relations Act to help the island defend itself.
Alexander Huang Chieh-cheng, a professor of international relations and strategic studies at Tamkang University in New Taipei City, said Israel’s precision strikes against Iranian leaders and infrastructure held a sobering lesson for Taiwan.
“Israel used bunker-penetrating bombs to hit specific bedrooms of key individuals while simultaneously targeting military facilities. That’s the power of military intelligence,” Huang said in an interview with The Storm Media last weekend.
“Assuming that hiding somewhere will keep you safe is dangerous. A capable adversary will find you, and that fear alone can shatter a government’s confidence.”
Reflecting on Taiwan’s own infiltration cases, Huang warned: “These are not normal criminal investigations – this is national security. If we don’t take this seriously, it could be fatal.”
Su Tzu-yun, a senior analyst at the Institute for National Defence and Security Research, a Taiwanese military-affiliated think tank, echoed these concerns, warning that mainland Chinese espionage operations extended to the military, civil service and political communities.
“The danger lies in how China pieces together its intelligence puzzle. With overlapping sources across different agencies, it can build a detailed picture of Taiwan’s policy planning and leadership movements,” he said.
Su called on Taiwan to overhaul its security vetting systems. Under the law, only initial background checks are required for civil servants with access to sensitive information, and little is done to reassess risks after they are hired.
“Spies often exploit personal connections – school networks, family ties, political appointments. We need to conduct regular reviews, at least every one to two years, and make broader use of polygraph tests,” Su said.
Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung has acknowledged the damage, telling lawmakers last week that the espionage cases had “caused substantial harm” to the island’s foreign policy operations.
“The national security team is already reviewing this. We will strengthen vetting mechanisms for those with access to classified information,” Lin told the legislature. His comments were in response to Taiwan People’s Party lawmaker Huang Kuo-chang’s demand for the island’s security chief, Joseph Wu, to resign over the breach.
On Tuesday, lawmaker Hsu Chiao-hsin, of the opposition Kuomintang, echoed the call for Wu’s resignation, citing gross negligence.
“Back then, when Wu was foreign minister and before [his aide] resigned, rumours had already been circulated within the foreign ministry that this person might be a Chinese spy … As his superior, why didn’t [Wu] take action?” she said.
Government spokeswoman Michelle Lee said the cabinet had ordered special vetting procedures for civil servants involved in national security or sensitive national interests, effective June 16.
“The premier, vice-premier, secretary general, and two deputy secretaries general of the cabinet will be among the first to undergo enhanced vetting,” she said.
The new measures – which apply to some 2,000 civil servants – also mandate follow-up security and financial checks every three years for people in designated roles and require immediate review of anyone under investigation for national security violations, according to Lee.
While government action may address the bureaucratic dimension, experts said a whole-of-society approach was needed.
Huang noted that Taiwan, unlike Israel, did not yet have a deeply embedded national defence mindset across the civilian population.
“People still think war is something happening on HBO or Netflix – they think they can just turn it off when they’re tired. But the bloodshed from the Israel-Iran fighting should teach us something … If we ignore the signs, we’ll learn the hard way.”