As Israel and then the United States battered Iran this month, the reaction from China and Russia was surprisingly muted. For years, shared antagonism toward the U.S. has been pushing China, Russia, and Iran together. All three benefit from embarrassing the West in Ukraine and the Middle East, and widening the gaps between Washington and Europe. So after Israel鈥檚 first strike, on June 13, China鈥攖he strongest partner in the anti-America triad鈥攃ould have been expected to rush short-range missiles and other air-defense equipment to Iran. Surely, Beijing would use its growing diplomatic muscle to isolate Israel and the U.S., demand an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, and introduce a resolution deploring the two governments that were attacking China鈥檚 ally.
Instead, recent events in Iran have revealed that anti-Americanism can bind an alliance together only so much.
After ritually denouncing Israel鈥檚 first strike as 鈥渂razen鈥 and a 鈥渧iolation of Iran鈥檚 sovereignty,鈥 Beijing proceeded cautiously, emphasizing the need for diplomacy instead of further assigning blame. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi refrained from condemning Israel鈥檚 actions, in a call with his Israeli counterpart on June 14, and President Xi Jinping waited four days before calling for 鈥渄e-escalation鈥 and declaring that 鈥淐hina stands ready to work with all parties to play a constructive role in restoring peace and stability in the Middle East.鈥
After Iran鈥檚 parliament voted to close the Strait of Hormuz, Beijing鈥檚 foreign-affairs spokesperson stressed鈥攊n what looked like a warning to Iran鈥攖hat the Persian Gulf is a crucial global trade route for goods and energy, and called for partners to 鈥減revent the regional turmoil from having a greater impact on global economic growth.鈥
In calmer times, China, like Russia, is happy to use Iran as a battering ram against the U.S. and its allies. But when tensions turn into military confrontation and global stability is at risk, backing Iran looks like a far less sensible investment to Beijing than preserving its own economic and diplomatic relations with the West. China鈥檚 mild reaction isn鈥檛 just a blow to Iran; it may also suggest that the much ballyhooed 鈥渘o limits鈥 partnership between Xi and Russia鈥檚 President Vladimir Putin might not be as sturdy as Moscow and Beijing advertise.
Iran, Russia, and China have different ideologies, political regimes, and strategic aims. Iran鈥檚 relations with its two larger partners are wildly asymmetric.
China, for example, is Iran鈥檚 lifeline. It buys about 90 percent of Iran鈥檚 oil and supplies materials and technologies central to Iran鈥檚 weapons development. Yet the trading relationship matters less to China, which gets only about 10 percent of its oil from Iran. Plus, China has an economy more than 40 times as large, and it does far more business with the U.S. and the European Union.
Russia has interests that similarly diverge from Iran鈥檚, and it, too, has conspicuously refrained from coming to the Islamic Republic鈥檚 aid. But China following a similar approach toward Iran likely does not please Moscow. Although Moscow鈥檚 relations with Beijing are less lopsided than Tehran鈥檚 are, Russia鈥檚 economy is still less than one-eighth the size of China鈥檚. One-third of Russia鈥檚 state budget comes from oil sales, and China is the largest customer by far. Russia also depends on Chinese supplies for its war machine. This past March, the G7 foreign ministers called China a 鈥渄ecisive enabler鈥 of Russia鈥檚 war in Ukraine. But should the Kremlin begin to run out of money or soldiers, China鈥檚 willingness to bail out its ally is very much in doubt.
Even among authoritarian regimes, differences in values can limit cooperation. In 2023, Xi called Russia鈥檚 1917 October Revolution a 鈥渃annon blast鈥 that 鈥渂rought Marxism-Leninism to China, demonstrating the way forward and offering a new choice for the Chinese people who were seeking a way to save China from subjugation.鈥 Putin, despite his formative years in the Soviet-era KGB, now laments the fall of the Russian empire and describes Vladimir Lenin鈥檚 coup as the deed of 鈥減olitical adventurists and foreign forces鈥 who 鈥渄ivided the country and tore it apart for selfish benefit.鈥 The head of China鈥檚 Communist Party may resent Putin鈥檚 reduction of its Russian counterpart鈥攖he country鈥檚 second-largest party鈥攖o the status of another bit player in Russia鈥檚 rubber-stamping parliament.
Since World War II, leaders of Western democracies have successfully collaborated in part because they have shared a common worldview. Whether Iran鈥檚 Islamic theocrats can say the same about Xi, the leader of an avowedly atheist state, or Putin, who now positions himself as the champion of Orthodox Christianity, is another question entirely.
Beijing鈥檚 response to Iran鈥檚 predicament ought to make the West feel cautiously optimistic. If Donald Trump finally learns to distinguish the aggressor from the victim鈥攐r at least realizes that Putin has been playing him鈥攖he U.S. president could support Ukraine in earnest without worrying much about China expanding its assistance to Russia. As long as both Iran and Russia keep providing cheap oil and antagonizing the West and its allies, they are serving China鈥檚 purposes. But at least for now, Beijing looks unlikely to back either of its supposed partners if they jeopardize China鈥檚 interest in stability or its extensive and profitable relations with the West.