Though both Iran and Israel declared victory in the latest 12-day conflict, it is clear neither truly achieved a decisive win.
While Israel certainly demonstrated intelligence superiority, it ultimately failed to accomplish the objectives it announced to justify the war.
The most significant outcome of this conflict is that Netanyahu鈥檚 grand vision for a 鈥淣ew Middle East鈥 never materialized. His posturing about destroying Iran, collapsing its political system, and completely eliminating its nuclear program remain far-fetched aspirations, detached from reality.
While Israel did weaken the capabilities of Iran鈥檚 proxies, particularly Hezbollah, and the US successfully contained Iran-aligned groups in Iraq, neutralizing their threat to the US and Israel, this success in curbing Iran鈥檚 proxies was not replicated to the same degree with Iran itself.
One potential outcome of this conflict is that it might prompt Iran to reconsider the efficacy of its armed proxies.
Iran faced the Israeli aggression alone, without any support from these groups. It became conspicuously apparent that Iran insists on supporting armed factions, labeled 鈥渞esistance鈥 and 鈥渟teadfastness,鈥 in sovereign, non-occupied countries like Lebanon, Yemen, or Iraq. There is no legitimate basis for an armed faction to possess military equipment and weapons outside of state control, simply under the pretext of being a resistance group.
Iran鈥檚 resilience in this conflict undoubtedly stems from its engagement in a direct, 鈥減rincipal鈥 war rather than a proxy one. This meant the nation deployed its full reserves of strength, patience, maneuvering capability, and deterrence.
Thus, this display of resolve quickly made it clear to Israel that its fantasies of 鈥渄estroying鈥 Iran or collapsing its regime would not materialize.
Furthermore, despite significant intelligence breakthroughs by Israel within the Iranian system鈥檚 civilian and military elite鈥攍eading to the deaths of 17 nuclear scientists and over 20 military commanders鈥攖he combined ability of Israel and the US to establish an alternative to the current regime has proven nearly non-existent.
There鈥檚 a critical distinction between viewing the Iranian regime as one facing challenges and considering it a fragile system on the brink of collapse: it certainly does belong to the former category.
This is a regime that restricts opposition activities and engineers the political landscape to fit the Supreme Leader鈥檚 vision. The genuine competition between conservatives and reformists effectively ended after the 2009 elections.
Since then, the political rivalry has been confined to a struggle between conservatives favored by the Supreme Leader and reformists approved by him鈥攅ssentially, an internal competition among the regime鈥檚 own factions.
While this has injected a degree of vitality and internal renewal into the governing system, it has consistently remained bound by the strict rules imposed by the dominant religious ruling establishment in the country.
Iran is likely to change through its internal dynamics rather than through the supposed 鈥淗ebrew victory鈥 that never materialized, or through American strikes and schemes. Iran is also renowned for being a vibrant and capable society that can bring about change or precise reform as it deems fit.
About the author:
Amr al-Shobaki is an Egyptian writer, political analyst and managing-editor of Ahwal Masria magazine. He holds a Bachelor鈥檚 degree in Political Science from Cairo University (1983), a Master鈥檚 degree in Political Science from the Institute of Political Studies in France (1993), and a PhD in Political Science from the Sorbonne University in France (2002).