By Liu Zhen
The new space race is heating up, with the United States warning that its major rival China is narrowing the gap as it makes rapid technology gains.
While China says its ambitious plans remain peaceful and that it rejects the weaponisation of space, some of the technologies it has developed in recent years also have military uses. Here are some of them.
BeiDou network
The Chinese navigation satellite system provides positioning, navigation and timing services worldwide.
Its network of 60 satellites has been in full global operation since 2020, with the final backup satellites launched in 2024.
BeiDou – a symbol of China’s growing tech self-sufficiency – aims to challenge the dominance of GPS, the global positioning system run by the US military, especially in Belt and Road Initiative countries.
Besides its civilian applications, BeiDou provides navigation and positioning services to all branches of the Chinese military with even higher precision in the Asia-Pacific than GPS offers the US military.
That enables independent guidance for Chinese missiles, bombs and other precision munitions, with high accuracy. The People’s Liberation Army can also use BeiDou’s short messaging function to communicate.
Satellite comms
At least two low-Earth orbit communication satellite mega-constellations are currently in development in China as alternatives to SpaceX’s Starlink.
The Qianfan, or Thousand Sails, constellation – which is also known as the G60 Starlink – is a 14,000-satellite broadband network being developed by Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology. About 90 satellites have been launched since last year and the target date for completion is 2030.
Meanwhile the Guowang, or National Network, being developed by China Satellite Network Group aims to have two sub-constellations with a total of 13,000 satellites. It began at the end of 2024 and as of June, 34 satellites had been launched into low-Earth orbit.
Just as Starlink has provided Ukrainian forces with a satellite internet service during the war with Russia, these Chinese networks could give China’s military resilient connectivity during a conflict.
Their high-bandwidth and low-latency connections could enhance command and control, situational awareness and joint all-domain operations – especially when it comes to supporting unmanned equipment in the era of drone warfare.
China has developed a number of satellites with what is known as ISR – or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – capabilities.
They include the remote-sensing Yaogan satellites that have optical reconnaissance, synthetic-aperture radar and electronic intelligence sensors and are said to be primarily for military reconnaissance use.
Nasa describes the experimental communication technology network Tongxin Jishu Shiyan, or TJS – which is in geostationary orbit – as military satellites that provide early warning and signals intelligence for the PLA.
Another example is the Gaofen, or High Resolution, satellites that use optical, multispectral, radar and radio frequency for Earth observation. Officially they are for agricultural, disaster, resource and environmental monitoring, but given their capabilities they are also believed to have military uses too.
The US Space Force has claimed that, by the end of last year, more than 510 of the 1,060 Chinese satellites in orbit were capable of ISR and could be used by the PLA to monitor US and allied forces in the Pacific region.
Space planes
China is also developing an unmanned reusable spacecraft – similar to the American X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle – that can orbit the Earth for hundreds of days then return. The name of this secretive space plane is still classified, but many believe it could be the Shenlong, or Divine Dragon – a project listed under the country’s hi-tech development plan since the 1980s.
The reusable experimental spacecraft has already had three known missions. It made its maiden flight in 2020, when it was delivered into orbit by a launch vehicle, flew for two days and landed in western Xinjiang province.
It spent nine months in orbit during a second mission in 2022, then more than eight months in orbit on a third mission from 2023. Each time, unidentified objects were released before its re-entry.
The spacecraft could be used as an experimental platform for space technologies, including power systems and the durable materials needed for hypersonics, and it could also be suitable for surveillance.
It could also have other military uses. Since it would be able to deploy payloads, it could be used to launch small satellites or release destructive weapons targeted at other satellites or even the ground. And if it can retrieve payloads like the X-37B, it could also be used to capture adversarial space assets.
China is developing another reusable space plane called the Tengyun, or Cloud Rider, designed to separate in two at an altitude of 30-40km (18-24 miles), with the first stage returning to the ground while the second stage continues its ascent to low-Earth orbit. Its first flight is planned for 2030.
Stalking and dogfights
China’s Shijian and TJS satellites have been observed performing “unusual, large and rapid” orbital manoeuvres that US officials have described as “stalking” – closely approaching, tracking and monitoring American satellites apparently to collect intelligence or potentially disrupt operations.
Among those targeted were US Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Programme satellites and Silent Barker observation satellites, according to the US Space Force.
It said earlier this year that three Shiyan-24C and two Shijian-6 05A/B satellites had carried out synchronised controlled moves in low-Earth orbit in what one Space Force official called “dogfighting in space”.
These manoeuvres – rendezvous and proximity operations, docking and capture – are needed for peaceful missions such as removing orbital debris, but they could also be used in attacks against high-value military satellites.
Space junk and refuelling
Dealing with space debris – from monitoring to early warning and emergency response – has been listed as a key task by Beijing. The China National Space Administration has sent several satellites, mainly Shijian, to experiment with orbital maintenance and cleaning up space debris.
Several methods have been tested to clear space junk, including scooping it up with robotic arms and nets, and obliterating it with lasers.
But these technologies could also be used for anti-satellite warfare, to take down probes that are critical for positioning, navigation and timing, for command, control and communications, as well as missile early warning and other vital military functions.
The US Space Force raised concern over the Shijian-17 satellite launched in 2016, which it said had made some “unusual manoeuvres” in geostationary orbit and varied its position in relation to other satellites. The Space Force also noted that its robotic arm could be used “for grappling other satellites”.
These concerns escalated when the Shijian-21, launched in 2021, towed a defunct BeiDou navigation satellite from geostationary orbit to a higher “graveyard” orbit in 2022.
The Shijian-21 used up much of its propellant during that operation, and China now appears to be about to attempt the first satellite-to-satellite refuelling and servicing mission in high orbit – closely watched by the US.
This year, the Shijian-25 satellite was launched for the mission, which would mark major technological progress and the potential to significantly extend the operational lifespan of space assets.
Anti-satellite weapons
China conducted its first successful direct ascent anti-satellite missile test in 2007. A land-based ballistic missile directly intercepted and destroyed a defunct Fengyun-1C weather satellite in low-Earth orbit, generating a large amount of debris and drawing international criticism.
In a 2013 test, a ballistic object was launched to an altitude of 30,000km, suggesting it could be capable of shooting down satellites in geostationary orbit (35,786km).
Ground-based laser weapons and powerful orbital- and ground-based jamming are among other anti-satellite capabilities the PLA is pursuing.