China’s bold words on the Israel-Iran war mask a deeper truth: it’s defending itself, not Tehran — and its influence is weaker than it looks.
US President Donald Trump has said a ceasefire is imminent, declaring an end to what he called “the 12-day war” — but Iran has pushed back, saying no agreement has been reached.
Tehran’s message was conditional: It would hold fire only if Israel ended what it described as “illegal aggression”, leaving the diplomatic picture murky.
Amid that uncertainty, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a high-profile move on the global stage, with Beijing submitting a draft UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire between Israel and Iran.
The move followed a rare and sharply worded rebuke from Beijing: both the Chinese Foreign Ministry and China’s UN envoy Fu Cong condemned the United States for bombing Iranian nuclear sites, calling it a violation of international law and a serious threat to regional stability.
This assertiveness has landed just as the NATO summit prepares to convene on Tuesday night in the Netherlands, though Beijing’s options are limited.
With a growing presence in Middle East diplomacy, Beijing wants to appear as a stabilising force.
However, its motivations are more self-serving: defending authoritarian sovereignty, preserving energy supplies, and avoiding deeper entanglement in an unpredictable war.
Now that the fighting has paused, those motivations are even more stark. Beijing was vocal, but ultimately uninvolved. It let the US shape both the military outcome and the diplomatic narrative.
Defending Iran to defend Xi
Iran is not a natural ally for China. One is an Islamic theocracy, the other a Marxist-Leninist regime deeply suspicious of religion.
But both are sanctioned, isolated by the West, and fiercely opposed to US global dominance.
China’s loud defence of Iranian sovereignty reflects more than a concern for international law. It mirrors Xi’s desire to shield his own regime from outside pressure and perceived threats to legitimacy.
The economic stakes are just as high. China reportedly purchases up to 90 per cent of Iran’s oil exports, mostly in defiance of US and EU sanctions.
Iran supplies China with discounted crude, while China provides Tehran with a critical economic lifeline.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called out China’s competing priorities — publicly urging Beijing to stop Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz, given its deep dependence on Gulf energy.
China and Iran’s partnership is strategic but transactional, and Beijing is careful not to let it jeopardise broader regional interests — particularly as it navigates a 90-day pause in trade tensions with the US over tariffs on Chinese goods.
Xi’s early comments were notably more cautious than those of Foreign Minister Wang Yi or their UN envoy, signalling a leadership approach designed to hedge bets.
Iran’s evident military vulnerability and the real prospect of a joint US-Israeli escalation have made Beijing wary of investing too much capital into an unstable ally.
Trump dismissed Iran’s final strike as “very weak”. For Beijing, its restrained posture now looks like a calculated move to avoid being drawn in.
Middle East balancing act
China’s relationship with the broader Middle East remains a delicate balancing act.
While Iran serves as a geopolitical lever, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are crucial economic partners.
Saudi Arabia is China’s second-largest oil supplier, and the UAE functions as a key logistics and financial hub for Chinese companies.
However, ideological tensions run deep.
China’s repression of Uyghur muslims in Xinjiang has drawn quiet but persistent criticism across the Islamic world.
Although Arab governments have largely remained silent, the cultural gap between China and its Muslim partners persists.
It also limits Beijing’s ability to act as a credible mediator.
These dynamics were evident in Beijing’s uneven tone. It reacted far more forcefully to the US strike on Iran’s nuclear sites than it did to Israel’s actions in Gaza.
While Iran is seen as a sovereign partner and source of energy, Gaza represents a complex humanitarian issue without a clear strategic upside.
Beijing’s diplomacy, in this sense, is guided less by values than by leverage.
No real axis
While the growing ties between China, Russia and Iran are often described as an emerging anti-Western bloc, the reality is more fragile.
Recent cooperation is more about mutual interest than mutual trust.
China remains hesitant to tie itself too closely to Russia after Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, and the same caution applies to Iran.
Even with strong language at the UN and a phone call between Xi and Putin stressing de-escalation, there is little to suggest Beijing is willing to do more than talk.
It wants stability in the Gulf, continued access to oil, and a distracted US — not a military entanglement in the Middle East.
Trump’s announcement of a ceasefire underscores the limits of China’s diplomacy. Despite positioning itself as a champion of restraint, Beijing played no direct role in brokering the end of hostilities.
Instead, it was the US — and Trump personally — that claimed centre stage.
Despite Washington’s hopes that China might restrain Iran, Beijing is unlikely to play the mediator in any meaningful way.
Calls for peace and restraint offer international legitimacy, but little substance.
In the end, China’s main goal was to protect its own interests — and it did so quietly.
Its calls for ceasefires, its UN diplomacy, and even its condemnations are part of a low-key strategy: defend the regime, protect the economy, and keep global chaos at bay — as long as it doesn’t have to get directly involved.
With the 12-day war now apparently over, Beijing avoided consequences — but it has also missed a chance to shape the outcome.
For Australia and its allies, the test lies ahead. As war escalates in the Middle East and global alliances are reshaped, the question is not just how China positions itself — but what it actually dares to do.