By Timothy Ash
News has been filtering through of an Armenia – Azerbaijan – T眉rkiye deal over the Zangezur corridor – this follows the visit of Armenian PM Pashinyan to T眉rkiye last month.
A few conclusions herein:
First, it augurs well for a final Armenia – Azerbaijan peace deal, to finally close off the decade鈥檚- long disputes over Nagornyi Karabakh and offers the potential for the opening of borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan and T眉rkiye. That鈥檚 a huge potential trade and transit win for all three, opening the way from Central Asia to Europe, through these three states.
Second, for T眉rkiye any deal with Armenia would further help ease relations with Europe, and the US, which had been strained by lobbying from the Armenian diaspora over related issues.
Third, this is another huge defeat for Russia, and I would argue a consequence of its disastrous war on Ukraine. Because Russia has been bogged down in the war in Ukraine it has been unable to use military force to defend its interests in the South Caucasus.
This means that when Azerbaijan, supported by Turkish military and technology supplies, launched its latest offensive in Nagornyi Karabakh in 2023, Russia was unable to honor its security commitments to Armenia, and the result was an overwhelming victory by Azerbaijan. Armenian PM Pashinyan is now having to live with the consequences of that, and signing a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan, and normalizing relations with T眉rkiye, is just part of that process.
Seeing Russian influence waning, Pashinyan has sought to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and T眉rkiye and deepen ties with Europe (particularly France) as he seeks to pull Armenia finally out of the Russian orbit. Russia has tried to stall this process by intervening in Armenia politics to try and undermine and weaken Pashinyan – there have recently been reports of coup efforts against Pashinyan, supported by Russia.
Azerbaijan has been resisting a final peace deal until changes are made in the Armenian constitution, affirming Baku鈥檚 control over NK. This has been difficult for Pashinyan given his poll ratings are lagging and he faces elections. He has been stalling making these concessions until after elections. However, the concession to Azerbaijan and T眉rkiye now over the Zangezur corridor might see Azerbaijan also offer concessions on these same constitutional demands.
This might allow for a final peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan to be signed very shortly. Pashinyan hopes that any economic windfall benefits from the opening of borders and improved visa rights for Armenians to Europe will eventually bring him salvation in elections.
Russia is now seeing both Armenia and Azerbaijan pull out of its orbit, towards Europe and T眉rkiye, and is obviously unhappy. Recent attacks/arrests on/of Azeris in Russia might be part of Moscow鈥檚 efforts to retaliate against Baku. Baku has shown it is not going to be pushed around, however, as reflected in the recent detentions made at Russia鈥檚 Sputnik officers in Baku.
The gloves are off on both sides. I doubt Moscow would seek a direct military confrontation with Baku though as a) the Azerbaijan military has shown that it is a capable force in recent wars in NK; b) any Russian attack on Azerbaijan would risk a war with T眉rkiye; c) the Russian military is already stretched in Ukraine.
The irony now, though, is that while Armenia and Azerbaijan move out of Russia鈥檚 orbit, neighboring Georgia, once the darling of the West, has been pulled back towards Moscow by the Russia-leaning Georgia Dream/Ivanishvili administration. Pro-Western demonstrations are still ongoing there, albeit met by arrests and force by the incumbent regime. Georgia is still in play, in terms of the pull-push between Russia and the West.
A further complication is the involvement of China through its bid to run the Anaklia port. The latter has annoyed the Trump administration, which is still supporting efforts in the U.S. Congress to sanction the Ivanishvili regime, even though it fits into the populist, far-right, family values, Trump world of Viktor Orban, Robert Fico, et al.
Fourth, and finally, Azerbaijan and T眉rkiye鈥檚 push on the Zangezur corridor is also using the opportunity provided by the weakness of Iran following recent U.S./Israeli attacks. Hitherto Iran had opposed the opening of the Zangezur corridor.
Reprinted from the author鈥檚 @tashecon blog. See the original here.
The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.