By Radio Nacional
The Active Serbian Secret Service in Tirana and Pristina: Infiltration Methods, Hybrid Warfare, and the Necessary Response of National Intelligence Services
Study by Col. Flamur Buçpapaj
For the students of the Intelligence Academy
“In the silent era of hybrid warfare, occupation doesn’t come with soldiers, but with ideas that appear harmless.”
— Epigraph for modern Albania and Kosovo
According to Albanian law on foreign nationals and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a sovereign state has the right to declare any foreign citizen persona non grata who:
Acts against national security interests;
Incites hatred, division, or political and social destabilization;
Supports anti-Albanian structures or ideologies, even when masked as “personal opinion.” Close Cooperation Needed with Partner Services (CIA, MI6, BND) for Information Sharing
Strengthened Cyber Control
Establishment of Cyber Defense Agencies with advanced technology to trace the sources of attacks.
24/7 monitoring of social networks for coordinated destabilizing campaigns.
Strong Legislation on Financial Transparency
Prohibition of funding for NGOs, media outlets, or political parties from sources with suspicious ties to Serbia.
Thorough investigation of every case involving the spread of hybrid propaganda.
The Serbian secret service remains a real and sophisticated threat to the stability of Albania and Kosovo. Their hybrid warfare is not marked by uniforms but by sleeper agents, propaganda, cyberattacks, and social manipulation. Countering this requires more than reaction — it demands the construction of a national and regional hybrid security strategy, with a strong focus on intelligence.
The Infiltration Architecture of the Serbian Secret Service in Albanian Territories
The Serbian secret service (BIA – Bezbednosno-informativna agencija) has established an extensive and sophisticated infiltration network in Albania and Kosovo, built upon the historical experience of the Yugoslav services (UDBA) and the legacy of covert operations in the region. This infiltration strategy does not rely solely on classically trained agents, but also on prolonged social, economic, and ideological influence, which through covert networks and influence operations, impacts democratic processes and institutional stability in both Albanian states.
Infiltration into Media and Public Opinion
One of the key pillars of hybrid operations is the strategic dissemination of messages through internal media channels:
In Kosovo and Albania, media outlets have been identified that frequently relay narratives aligned with Belgrade’s positions on issues such as the status of Kosovo, the history of the conflict, or accusations against the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army).
Infiltrated agents posing as journalists, analysts, bloggers, or social media administrators work to increase public confusion, promote division, and delegitimize national institutions.
This propaganda is often mixed with disinformation and uses language that promotes “Serbian realpolitik” while downplaying or relativizing war crimes in Kosovo.
Agent Networks in NGOs and Civil Society Structures
NGOs and civil society in both countries have been targeted as useful tools by the Serbian services:
By founding new organizations or infiltrating existing ones, BIA manages to impose the discourse of “regional cooperation” with hidden geopolitical objectives.
Some organizations claiming to be “peacebuilding” or “intercultural” have promoted narratives that diminish the statehood of Kosovo and frame its relationship with Serbia as a “domestic issue.”
A number of these NGOs have accessed international funding, creating a perfect cover for foreign influence operations.
Infiltration into Religious Institutions and the Use of Cultural Sensitivities
Religious institutions are particularly sensitive in post-conflict societies like Kosovo and in regions with histories of ethnic division. The Serbian service has utilized:
Clergy or religious figures with pro-Serbian orientations, who sometimes engage in disinformation activities under the guise of reconciliation, while in reality undermining the Albanian narrative of independence and historical justice.
Some structures of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo have been used not only for religious influence but also as logistical or symbolic centers for anti-state activities.
Fragmentation within religious communities, particularly in Pristina, has been a method of weakening social cohesion and creating artificially stimulated interfaith tensions.
Participation in Political Parties and Administrative Structures
One of the most dangerous forms of infiltration is the capture or influence of political parties or figures within them:
In specific cases, politicians with suspicious ties to Serbian circles have been identified, who through rhetoric of “reconciliation” have obstructed key state-building processes.
Some decision-making structures, especially at the local level in Kosovo (in Serb-majority municipalities), are fully influenced by Belgrade’s agent network.
In Albania, through individuals recruited for purely financial motives, secret communication and penetration channels have been established within levels of public administration.
Corruption as a Gateway to Infiltration
Corruption remains the most open gateway for infiltration:
has shifted its focus to hybrid warfare aimed at weakening democratic institutions and eroding public trust in the state.
Infiltration Methods and Agent Networks
1. Recruitment of Sleeper Agents
The Serbian secret service has established long-term networks through:
Agents infiltrated in media, NGOs, religious institutions, and political parties;
Exploitation of corruption, recruiting individuals vulnerable to financial interests as informants or collaborators.
2. Blackmail and Pressure
A classic tactic involves using personal files, especially in Kosovo and Albania, to blackmail individuals with a dark past into cooperation.
3. Use of the Diaspora
The Albanian diaspora in Europe is a terrain exploited by BIA to establish contacts and recruit intermediaries who do not fall directly under the radar of national intelligence services.
Hybrid Warfare: New Destabilization Tactics
1. Disinformation Campaigns
Media outlets close to Belgrade disseminate fake news aimed at creating societal divisions (North-South in Albania, North-South in Kosovo, or ethnic and religious splits).
Social networks are used to amplify tensions and provoke violent protests.
2. Terrorist Incidents and Provocations
Armed incidents in northern Kosovo, such as the Banjska attack (September 2023), are classic examples of operations organized by BIA and parallel Serbian structures.
Suspected cases of infiltration into political protests in Albania that could escalate into acts of violence.
3. Activated Sleeper Agents
At key moments (elections, protests, tensions between Kosovo and Serbia), these agents are activated to influence public opinion and decision-making.
Cyber Threat and Digital Infrastructure
The Serbian secret service, in cooperation with other agencies, including the Russian GRU, possesses advanced cyber interference capabilities:
Hacking institutional websites;
Infiltrating the communication systems of intelligence services;
Organized “bot” campaigns that manipulate public opinion online.
How to Respond: Strategic Measures
1. Restructuring TOTMAs and International Cooperation
TOTMA (Deep Monitoring Agent Operations Task Forces) in Albania and Kosovo must transition to a proactive, not just defensive, phase. Close Cooperation Needed with Partner Services (CIA, MI6, BND) for Information Sharing
Strengthened Cyber Control
Establishment of Cyber Defense Agencies with advanced technology to trace the sources of attacks.
24/7 monitoring of social networks for coordinated destabilizing campaigns.
Strong Legislation on Financial Transparency
Prohibition of funding for NGOs, media outlets, or political parties from sources with suspicious ties to Serbia.
Thorough investigation of every case involving the spread of hybrid propaganda.
The Serbian secret service remains a real and sophisticated threat to the stability of Albania and Kosovo. Their hybrid warfare is not marked by uniforms but by sleeper agents, propaganda, cyberattacks, and social manipulation. Countering this requires more than reaction — it demands the construction of a national and regional hybrid security strategy, with a strong focus on intelligence.
The Infiltration Architecture of the Serbian Secret Service in Albanian Territories
The Serbian secret service (BIA – Bezbednosno-informativna agencija) has established an extensive and sophisticated infiltration network in Albania and Kosovo, built upon the historical experience of the Yugoslav services (UDBA) and the legacy of covert operations in the region. This infiltration strategy does not rely solely on classically trained agents, but also on prolonged social, economic, and ideological influence, which through covert networks and influence operations, impacts democratic processes and institutional stability in both Albanian states.
Infiltration into Media and Public Opinion
One of the key pillars of hybrid operations is the strategic dissemination of messages through internal media channels:
In Kosovo and Albania, media outlets have been identified that frequently relay narratives aligned with Belgrade’s positions on issues such as the status of Kosovo, the history of the conflict, or accusations against the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army).
Infiltrated agents posing as journalists, analysts, bloggers, or social media administrators work to increase public confusion, promote division, and delegitimize national institutions.
This propaganda is often mixed with disinformation and uses language that promotes “Serbian realpolitik” while downplaying or relativizing war crimes in Kosovo.
Agent Networks in NGOs and Civil Society Structures
NGOs and civil society in both countries have been targeted as useful tools by the Serbian services:
By founding new organizations or infiltrating existing ones, BIA manages to impose the discourse of “regional cooperation” with hidden geopolitical objectives.
Some organizations claiming to be “peacebuilding” or “intercultural” have promoted narratives that diminish the statehood of Kosovo and frame its relationship with Serbia as a “domestic issue.”
A number of these NGOs have accessed international funding, creating a perfect cover for foreign influence operations.
Infiltration into Religious Institutions and the Use of Cultural Sensitivities
Religious institutions are particularly sensitive in post-conflict societies like Kosovo and in regions with histories of ethnic division. The Serbian service has utilized:
Clergy or religious figures with pro-Serbian orientations, who sometimes engage in disinformation activities under the guise of reconciliation, while in reality undermining the Albanian narrative of independence and historical justice.
Some structures of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo have been used not only for religious influence but also as logistical or symbolic centers for anti-state activities.
Fragmentation within religious communities, particularly in Pristina, has been a method of weakening social cohesion and creating artificially stimulated interfaith tensions.
Participation in Political Parties and Administrative Structures
One of the most dangerous forms of infiltration is the capture or influence of political parties or figures within them:
In specific cases, politicians with suspicious ties to Serbian circles have been identified, who through rhetoric of “reconciliation” have obstructed key state-building processes.
Some decision-making structures, especially at the local level in Kosovo (in Serb-majority municipalities), are fully influenced by Belgrade’s agent network.
In Albania, through individuals recruited for purely financial motives, secret communication and penetration channels have been established within levels of public administration.
Corruption as a Gateway to Infiltration
Corruption remains the most open gateway for infiltration:
Individuals involved in financial scandals, tax evasion, or other affairs are easy to recruit through blackmail or economic offers.
The Serbian service uses classic recruitment methods: gathering compromising information, indirect threats, and then offering “protection” in exchange for cooperation.
In many cases, recruits are not even aware that they are working for Serbian interests, as recruitment occurs through third-party intermediaries or cover organizations.
The Serbian infiltration model in Albania and Kosovo is complex, built on experience, institutional cover, and exploitation of internal weaknesses such as corruption and social fragmentation. Therefore, the defense strategy must begin with a thorough audit of vulnerable sectors, financial transparency, and the creation of a legal framework to prohibit malicious foreign influence—including criminal penalties for cooperating with foreign intelligence agencies in public functions.
Specific Cases of Serbian Secret Service Infiltration and Influence
1. The Banjska Case – Serbian Parallel Security Units in Northern Kosovo
On September 24, 2023, an armed Serbian paramilitary group directly linked to Serbian security structures attacked Kosovo Police in the village of Banjska, Zvečan municipality. During the clash, a Kosovo Police officer was killed, followed by the killing of the group’s leader, Milan Radoičić, a well-known political and financial figure in northern Kosovo.
Radoičić was the deputy head of the Serbian List and closely connected with Serbian intelligence structures.
Investigations showed the group had logistical support, sophisticated armaments, and an organized plan to destabilize northern Kosovo.
The goal was to create a “safe corridor” for possible Serbian intervention in northern Kosovo.
This is a typical example of activating infiltration networks and sleeper agents to create chaos and provoke open conflict. The Banjska incident represents one of the most overt hybrid warfare and military-political infiltration operations by Serbia.
2. Disinformation Networks on Social Media in Albania (2021–2023)
Between 2021 and 2023, multiple fake profiles on social networks (Twitter, Facebook, Telegram) linked to Russo-Serbian influence centers began spreading destabilizing propaganda in Albania:
Inciting hatred against the West and NATO.
Relativizing Serbian war crimes in Kosovo.
Posts portraying Kosovo as part of historical Serbia.
Spreading conspiracy theories about “federalization” of Kosovo or “ethnic division.”
According to a Graphika report (an organization monitoring global disinformation campaigns), networks connected to the “Strategic Culture Foundation” (sanctioned by the US as a front for Russian intelligence) were active in Albanian spaces through pro-Serbian interfaces and sometimes pages with Albanian names but content spreading Serbian narratives.
3. Information Leaks from Administration in Northern Mitrovica (2019–2022)
Documented cases by EULEX and Kosovo Police showed:
Local officials in northern Kosovo municipalities leaked sensitive information about police movements, new station constructions, and plans for integrating illegal Serbian structures into the Kosovo system.
These officials acted in coordination with BIA to maintain Belgrade’s control over these areas, often openly and without punishment.
Some of these individuals were suspected intermediaries in arms, cigarette, and currency smuggling, later financing parallel Serbian influence networks in Kosovo.
4. Infiltration Through NGOs and Suspicious Financing in Albania
Investigative reports from Albanian sources (like BIRN and Exit.al) revealed several NGOs and small institutes receiving indirect funding from institutions linked to Serbian or Russian entities:
An NGO with an Albanian name but suspicious Serbian financial ties organized conferences with “intellectuals” who relativized war events in Kosovo and showed “historical tolerance” toward Milošević’s positions.
Cultural “regional” activities were held in Tirana with participation from representatives of a “peace center” linked to former UDBA officers promoting ethnic division of Kosovo as the “only solution.”
These cases represent soft ideological infiltration, often flying under the intelligence services’ radar due to masking as academic or cultural activities.
Recruitment and Blackmail as Key Mechanisms of the Serbian Agency
In the Serbian secret service strategy, recruiting individuals within Albanian institutions in Kosovo and Albania is a key element of building internal influence. This process is not always based on ideological conviction but on exploiting personal weaknesses, compromising data, or financial motivations. Recruitment does not always happen directly; it often occurs through intermediaries to maintain “operational distance” and cover of the active agent.
Recruitment Targets
The groups most targeted by the Serbian secret service for recruitment are:
Low and mid-level officials in the administration who have access to technical information, operational plans, or sensitive databases.
Journalists and political analysts who can influence public opinion and the national discourse. There are some pro-Serbian analysts who insult Albania; I believe they should be banned from entering Albania.
Civil society activists, especially those involved in “sensitive” issues such as minority rights, regional cooperation, or interfaith politics.
Former public officials who have lost their positions, feel neglected, and are open to external offers.
Individuals with debts, personal problems, or dark legal records who can be easily blackmailed.
Recruitment Methods
A. Financial Gain and Material Offers
This is the most classic and effective form, especially in countries with high corruption and economic poverty.
The Serbian service uses “donations,” payments for fictitious consulting, or false projects to reward informants or bought opinion leaders.
In some cases, those involved do not initially know they are serving BIA interests, as the operation is conducted through a third layer.
B. Personal Blackmail (Kompromat)
BIA systematically collects compromising information on public figures, politicians, and local leaders through:
Intimate materials (videos, audio).
Data on corruption or past crimes.
Information about personal affairs, secret relationships, or undeclared assets.
After verifying vulnerability, the individual is faced with a “choice”: public exposure or silent cooperation.
This method is especially used in tense areas such as Mitrovica, Leposavić, Preševo, and also in Tirana for officials with access to security, energy, or justice sectors.
C. Use of Personal and Emotional Connections
The Serbian service is skilled in exploiting blood ties, old friendships, or romantic connections to recruit individuals.
Documented cases exist where a former student from Kosovo, educated in Belgrade, is used as a “middleman” to offer new connections within Kosovo’s institutions.
People with close ties to Serbian communities in northern Kosovo or with a Yugoslavian past are used as social bridges for deep penetration.
Documented Cases of Recruitment and Blackmail
Case: Milan Radoičić and Links to Infiltrated Local Leaders
During post-attack investigations in Banjska (2023), it was found that some Albanian and Serbian local officials in northern Kosovo municipalities provided indirect support for paramilitary group movements in the area. Suspicion was that cooperation was induced by threats of exposing illegal ties and promises of protection from legal prosecution.
Case: Infiltration of a Public Institution in Albania via Fictitious Contracts
In 2022, an internal investigation in an Albanian public agency linked to the energy sector discovered a technical employee had transmitted information about contracts with foreign partners. Later, suspicious payments were found in his account from an NGO in Belgrade connected to a strategic institute which turned out to be a “front” for BIA operational analysis.
Recruitment and blackmail are the two most used tools by Serbian services to build sustainable influence and control internal political and social processes in Albania and Kosovo. These methods require immediate response through:
Creating a special unit to investigate foreign influence in public and civil sectors.
Deepening security vetting for individuals in key positions.
Clear legislation to punish cooperation with foreign services and ban financing from entities linked to hostile agencies.
Cases of Serbian Service Infiltration in Kosovo
1. The Banjska Case – Milan Radoičić and Paramilitary Groups (September 2023)
Description: An armed Serbian group led by Milan Radoičić (deputy head of the Serbian List) attacked Kosovo Police in Banjska, killing officer Afrim Bunjaku.
The group had military logistics and organized shelter in the Banjska Monastery.
Sophisticated weapons, drones, and military-style communication devices were seized.
Radoičić publicly admitted involvement and claimed he did not notify Serbian authorities, but international reports link him directly to BIA.
Sources: Reports from the Kosovo Government, EULEX, FBI, and international media such as The Guardian, Reuters, and Deutsche Welle.
2. The Serbian-Russian Influence Network in Northern Kosovo (2021–2024)
Description: Hundreds of documents and local sources revealed that parallel structures in the north (North Mitrovica, Zvečan, Leposavić, Zubin Potok) are controlled by individuals linked to BIA.
Social security, energy, health, and education structures continue to receive orders from Belgrade.
Members of these structures receive payments from Serbia and regularly report to operational centers in Raška and Belgrade.
Some of them are involved in smuggling, money laundering, and arms supply.
Source: Report by OSCE International Monitors (2022), Kosovo Police Report, EULEX, RFERL.
Case of Online Disinformation and Serbian Portals in Kosovo (2019–2023)
Description: A series of Serbian-language portals (such as “Kosovo Online,” “Srpski Telegraf,” “Novosti”) have editorial offices in northern Mitrovica but are funded and managed by structures linked to the Serbian government and BIA.
These portals spread false information, messages of hatred against Albanians, and undermine Kosovo’s institutions.
They use fake networks on Facebook and Twitter to amplify their influence.
Source: Balkan Center for Disinformation (BCDI) Report, EU vs Disinfo, Graphika.
Case of Infiltration in Civil Protests in Kosovo (2015–2021)
Description: Protests organized against Kosovo institutions, especially in the north, have been infiltrated by individuals trained by BIA.
Masked persons equipped with explosives and military communication devices.
Incidents often coincide with high-level political meetings in Brussels, used as pressure against the Kosovo government.
Source: Reports by Kosovo Police and KFOR.
Cases of Serbian Service Infiltration in Albania
1. Case of Suspicious NGOs with Links to Belgrade (2018–2023)
Description: Several NGOs in Tirana and Durrës have been identified as receiving indirect funding through institutes in Serbia.
One NGO promoted “Balkan cultural cooperation” but was linked to an institute associated with former UDBA officers.
Funding came from “academic funds” connected to the “Sloboda” foundation in Belgrade, identified by Western institutions as a BIA influence instrument.
Source: Investigations by Exit.al, BIRN, and security report by ISC Tirana.
2. Case of Infiltrated Former Officials via Corrupt Networks (2016–2020)
Description: Former justice and security officials in Albania are suspected of assisting in passing sensitive information to foreign services.
In one case, a Ministry of Interior employee in Albania was dismissed following suspicions of leaking information about cross-border cooperation plans with Kosovo.
He had family ties to former military personnel educated in Belgrade.
Source: SHISH Report and Anti-Corruption Task Force, 2019.
Case of Pro-Serbian Media Propaganda in Some Albanian Portals (2020–2023)
Description: Some independent Albanian portals and analysts promoted narratives aligning with Serbian interests regarding Kosovo.
One portal received payments through an NGO based in Belgrade.
Articles relativized war crimes in Kosovo and attacked UÇK leaders.
Source: Investigative journalism inquiries, report by OSC Media Literacy Watch.
Case of Exposure of Former UDBA Collaborators in Albania (post-1997)
Description: UDBA archives (discovered in the 2000s by researchers in Slovenia and Croatia) revealed names of Albanians in Albania who collaborated with Yugoslav services.
Some of these names returned to public functions or civil society after 2000.
Some are suspected to have maintained covert links with operative circles in Belgrade.
Source: UDBA archive reports from Ljubljana and Zagreb.
These cases represent a particular form of infiltration called “soft ideological infiltration,” where influence does not occur through open or aggressive actions, but through transmitting ideas, narratives, and political positions under the cover of academic, cultural, or civic activities.
This type of infiltration is especially dangerous because:
It is masked by language of tolerance, intercultural cooperation, and academic exchange, making it difficult for security institutions to identify as an immediate threat.
It does not follow classic operational espionage schemes but relies on the gradual shaping of public opinion, especially among youth, academics, and the civil sector.
It creates a soft ground for future destabilization by promoting the relativization of historical truth and delegitimization of state institutions, particularly in Kosovo.
In some cases, these covert academic structures or “regional cultural institutes” have organized conferences which, after content analysis, turned out to be platforms promoting:
Unjustified pro-Serbian approaches regarding the war in Kosovo;
Coordinated criticisms against Kosovo and Albania’s international partners (USA, EU, NATO);
The idea of “federalization” or “functional division” of Kosovo as the only political solution.
Therefore, this “soft” infiltration, although it does not operate through violent means, represents a gradual, systemic, and deliberate risk aimed at dismantling the state-building narrative and the collective memory of Albanian societies through cultural warfare tools.
Case: Regional Conference “Common Balkans – Challenges and Opportunities” (Tirana, May 2022)
Description of the activity:
On May 17, 2022, in Tirana, a conference titled “Common Balkans – Challenges and Opportunities” was held, organized by a newly established institute with a neutral name, financially supported by a “regional cultural cooperation” foundation linked to Novi Sad (Serbia).
In the official invitation, the conference was presented as an intercultural dialogue initiative among youth and academics from the Balkans, with participation from Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia.
Suspicious details and actual content:
The panel included three Serbian professors and a representative of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who relativized the events of the Kosovo war and suggested that “all parties shared equal responsibility.”
Terms such as “common geopolitical interest” and “functional federalization” of Kosovo were used in discussions as ways to achieve a “long-term solution.”
The Serbian representative of the organizing association had documented links with the “Center for Strategic Studies Belgrade,” an institute reported by OSCE and Graphika to have been partially funded by structures linked to the BIA and the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Reactions and later investigation:
The event was criticized by several Albanian researchers and media, labeling it as “a platform for Serbian hybrid propaganda in Tirana.”
An analysis by the Center for Security and Democracy Studies (QSSD) in Albania emphasized:
“The conference used moderated language to legitimize policies undermining Kosovo’s independence and to soften the perception of Serbia as an aggressor. It was a sophisticated form of ‘soft influence’ campaigns used by the Serbian secret service in other Balkan countries.”
Consequences:
The activity was not stopped by Albanian authorities because it formally respected the legal rules of organization.
The organization registered as an NGO under a different name after this event and has applied for funding from international programs focused on “peace and reconciliation.”
This case shows how the Serbian secret service and its influence structures use cultural, academic, and “regional” tools to penetrate Albanian public discourse—not aiming for true peace but to weaken the collective memory of Albanian suffering and normalize the Serbian state narrative as an equal historical party.
Strategies for Countering Serbian Infiltration and Hybrid Warfare
1. Need for a coordinated national and regional approach
Serbian hybrid warfare is not only armed actions or cyber attacks but a mixture of ideological influence, economic infiltration, diplomatic pressure, disinformation, and internal blackmail. Therefore, confronting it cannot be fragmented but must be built on an integrated doctrine of national security and civilian intelligence which:
Coordinates security, justice, diplomatic institutions, and civil society.
Is based on prevention and early detection, not just reaction after the fact.
Aims to protect legal, social, and cultural structures through education and information control.
2. Necessary countermeasures for Albania and Kosovo
A. Deep reform of counterintelligence (SHISH and AKI)
Creation of special units within SHISH and AKI exclusively tasked with:
Detecting foreign influence in NGOs, media, academia, and strategic sectors.
Training staff to trace hybrid campaigns, recruitment methods, and covert influence operations.
Cooperating with Western services for classified information sharing.
B. Thorough control of foreign funding in NGOs and cultural institutes
Special legislation for transparency of foreign funding requiring:
Registration of funding sources for every NGO operating in sensitive fields (culture, history, regional politics).
Publication of activities and periodic auditing of declared goals.
Strengthening the inter-institutional Task Force overseeing foreign influence, with investigative and punitive powers.
C. Establishment of a structure for strategic cyber defense
Foundation of a National Cybersecurity and Counter-Disinformation Agency that:
Detects and prevents cyber interventions orchestrated by BIA or related entities.
Monitors social networks, media platforms, and online forums for:
Coordinated disinformation;
False narratives on sensitive issues (Kosovo, UÇK, NATO, USA);
Low-profile operations to incite destabilization.
Cooperates with NATO and the EU for technological equipment and expert training.
D. Security vetting for key positions in administration, academia, and media
Implementation of an “expanded security vetting” for individuals who:
Participate in international projects with political impact;
Have access to sensitive information (administration, judiciary, or independent institutions);
Are involved in media influencing public opinion.
Includes investigation of sources of wealth, foreign contacts, and undisclosed family ties in the past.
National Education Against Hybrid Propaganda
Development of educational modules and training for students, university students, and administration on:
How foreign propaganda works;
How to identify an attempt at foreign influence;
The history of infiltrations and their consequences.
Increasing media literacy to strengthen social resistance against manipulative narratives.
Building a Joint Kosovo–Albania Architecture for National Security
Creation of a Joint Kosovo–Albania Strategic Security Committee with representatives from SHISH, AKI, Police, military, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Harmonization of legislation regarding crimes of cooperation with foreign services, ensuring:
Mutual jurisdiction for actions of foreign agents;
Joint response in cases of hybrid, cyber, or informational crises.
From Passive Defense to Proactive Prevention
Confronting Serbian infiltration and hybrid warfare can no longer be partial or reactive. It is time for Albania and Kosovo to build an integrated national defense strategy against foreign influence, with a unified approach, modern technology, and full civic support.
Only through coordinated action and full transparency about the risk can we protect not only institutions but also the political and cultural identity of Albanians in the Balkans.
Lithuania – Law on Prevention of Foreign Influence (2022)
Key contents:
Provides for thorough control of all foreign funding for NGOs, media, and academia dealing with political issues.
Punishes any cooperation with entities considered “instruments of hostile states” (mainly Russia and Belarus).
Includes national security measures in education by monitoring ideological content in curricula and public lectures.
Implementation:
Establishment of a Foreign Influence Transparency Register, mandatory for all public actors with foreign funds.
Persons violating the law are banned for 5 years from holding any public position.
Relevance for Albania and Kosovo:
Can be adapted to control cultural and “regional” institutes sponsored by Belgrade or linked to BIA.
Ukraine – Law on Countering Hybrid Propaganda and Foreign Agents (2019 and 2022)
Creates the legal category of “foreign influence agent” for individuals and legal entities.
Any media, NGO, or individual receiving funds from “unfriendly” states (mainly Russia) must publicly declare:
Funding relationships;
Ideological goals of projects;
Structural links to foreign governments.
Implementation:
Several portals were shut down for violations of this law.
A number of intellectuals and “strategic advisors” have been investigated as collaborators with Russian services.
Albania and Kosovo can apply a simplified version of this law to control academic, cultural, and media activities masking Serbian or Russian geopolitical interests.
Estonia – Law on Information Security and Education Against Foreign Influence (2017–2023)
Main measures:
Mandatory training for teachers and officials to recognize propaganda and information warfare techniques.
Integration of anti-disinformation modules in high schools and universities.
Implementation of a “Red Flag” system for individuals with unexplained foreign ties in strategic positions.
II. Strategic Summary for Policymakers (“Policy Brief”)
Strengthening National Security Against Serbian Infiltration and Hybrid Warfare in Albania and Kosovo
To offer concrete recommendations for security institutions and decision-makers to identify, prevent, and neutralize the influence of Serbian intelligence and hybrid operations on Albanian and Kosovar territory.
Current Context:
Use of “soft power” for ideological infiltration in media, academia, and NGOs.
Activation of sleeper agents in state institutions.
Disinformation campaigns and covert destabilization operations in Kosovo.
Main Recommendations:
Measure Description Responsible Institution
1. Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence Obligation to declare all funding from unfriendly states for NGOs, academia, media Parliament, Ministry of Justice
2. National Unit Against Hybrid Warfare Joint SHISH–AKI structure to monitor disinformation, propaganda, and ideological infiltration Prime Ministry, Ministry of Interior
3. Security Vetting for Key Positions Thorough screening of individuals in media, administration, and academia regarding foreign contacts SHISH, KPK, DSIK
4. Register of Foreign Agents Use of a legal category to identify persons and entities acting for foreign interests Parliament, Intelligence Services
5. National Education Against Hybrid Warfare Introduction of modules on information security and risks from foreign propaganda in schools and universities Ministry of Education, Security Academies
Immediate Benefits:
Increased social awareness of hybrid warfare risks.
Transparency in public activities with foreign funding.
Higher institutional immunity against ideological penetration.
Positioning Albania and Kosovo as ready partners for deep cooperation with NATO and the EU on information security.
Conclusion:
Albania and Kosovo must take concrete legal, institutional, and cultural steps to neutralize the risks posed by infiltration from Serbian intelligence services and hybrid warfare. The models of the Baltic states and Ukraine offer valuable frameworks adaptable to the Albanian reality.
Serbian secret service infiltration in Albania and Kosovo—carried out through classical operative methods, hybrid propaganda, and masked ideological influence—represents one of the greatest strategic threats to the national security of both Albanian states. In recent decades, Serbia has exploited institutional weaknesses, corruption, lack of intelligent coordination, and uncontrolled civil sector freedom to establish silent and dangerous influence networks.
Documented cases in Kosovo, such as Banjskë and the parallel structures in the north, show a well-organized capacity for violent destabilization and the creation of a parallel political reality. Equally concerning are the cases in Albania, where the soft influence of ideological structures…
Belgrade has aimed to relativize historical truths and change the perceptions of the new generation.
In an era of hybrid conflicts and sophisticated disinformation, national security cannot be protected solely with weapons or criminal laws, but requires building an integrated ecosystem of cultural, informational, legal, and civic resilience. For this reason, Albania and Kosovo must advance toward creating a joint security doctrine supported by modern laws, specialized agencies, intelligent technology, and deep cooperation with strategic Western allies.
Political freedom, state sovereignty, and historical truth are not guaranteed once and for all — they must be defended every day. And this defense begins with a deep awareness that infiltration is not just an external threat, but a battle for the future of national consciousness.
In a time of universally accepted deception, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.