By Melodie Ha
As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has modernized into a more capable global force, it has significantly expanded its international military engagement in support of China’s foreign policy objectives. Drawing on a new National Defense University monograph and updated database, this analysis examines trends in PLA military diplomacy from 2002 to 2024, focusing on three key activities: senior-level visits, naval port calls, and joint exercises. The PLA has historically been inward-facing. Even after China’s post-1978 opening, PLA foreign engagements remained limited, highly scripted, and more symbolic than substantive – shaped by an organizational culture of secrecy. Today, however, military diplomacy has become a vital tool of Chinese statecraft. It serves both strategic and operational aims: shaping the international environment in Beijing’s favor, laying groundwork for future overseas access, and enabling intelligence gathering and operational learning from foreign militaries. Figure 1 shows PLA military diplomatic interactions from 2002-2024. PLA military engagement grew steadily from 2002 to 2008, then plateaued from 2009 to 2019 before dropping sharply during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, the PLA conducted only 26 percent of the military-diplomatic activities it had in 2019. Activity has rebounded, but has yet to return to pre-pandemic levels. A notable shift occurred around 2009 with the rise of port calls and joint exercises, even as senior-level visits remained the most frequent form of engagement. Interactions peaked in 2010 and 2015 but declined afterward – likely due to Xi Jinping’s sweeping 2016 military reforms, which prioritized internal modernization over outward engagement. Geographically, Figure 2 shows that China’s military diplomacy remains concentrated in Asia, reflecting the PLA’s regional priorities. Approximately 40 percent of all engagements between 2002 and 2024 targeted Asia. Southeast Asia alone represented nearly half of those (20 percent of the global total), followed by South Asia (10 percent of the global total), driven primarily by China’s close ties with Pakistan. Southeast Asia has become an especially active arena amid intensifying China-U.S. strategic competition. Notably, even countries with maritime disputes or strategic frictions with Beijing – including Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea – have participated in exercises with the PLA. However, military engagement does not necessarily reflect strategic alignment; many of these countries maintain more substantive defense ties with the United States. Figure 3 shows the PLA’s growing presence in multilateral forums, marking a departure from its long-standing preference for bilateral engagements. Initially wary of multilateral settings due to concerns over narrative control, China now regularly participates in and hosts these events. The PLA engages in six recurring multilateral defense dialogues, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meetings, the Shangri-La Dialogue, and ASEAN-related forums, reflecting Beijing’s growing confidence and desire to shape regional security discussions on its own terms. Multilateral forums enable China to project influence more efficiently, amplify its strategic narratives, and legitimize its role in regional security architectures. Figure 4 shows trends in senior-level visits, which remain the most common form of PLA military diplomacy. As China has gained international stature, foreign militaries have increasingly accepted asymmetrical protocols – sending high-level delegations to China without demanding reciprocal visits. Between 2003 and 2009, outbound and inbound visits were balanced. After 2009, however, the PLA began hosting significantly more visits than it made, indicating growing willingness of other militaries to engage on China’s terms. In recent years, the PLA has also adopted U.S.-style “2+2” meetings – combining defense and foreign affairs officials – with partners like South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia to strengthen alignment across security and diplomatic channels. The second key domain of PLA military diplomacy is naval port calls. Although fewer in number, these visits visibly demonstrate the PLA Navy’s expanding reach. Regular port calls began in late 2008 and peaked at 50 visits in 2017. The establishment of China’s overseas military base in Djibouti that same year reduced reliance on replenishment visits in foreign ports. Port calls declined during the COVID-19 pandemic but had partially recovered to 35 visits by 2024 – still below the pre-pandemic peak. Military exercises constitute the third pillar of PLA diplomacy, offering valuable operational experience and opportunities to learn from foreign militaries. Most exercises are bilateral (83 percent in 2024), though multilateral participation has grown since 2014. High-profile multilateral exercises include SCO Peace Mission drills, Pakistan’s Aman naval exercises, and, until its 2018 disinvitation, the U.S.-led RIMPAC. These exercises often focus on nontraditional security issues, helping China project an image of cooperation and responsibility on the global stage. Over half – 53 percent – of PLA exercises have been conducted with Asian partners. A significant and growing share of exercises focus on military operations other than war (MOOTW), including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and noncombatant evacuations. MOOTW made up 41 percent of all PLA exercises over the period, and if anti-piracy and counterterrorism are included, nearly 75 percent of exercises fall under the nontraditional security category. The NDU database demonstrates that PLA military engagement is highly sensitive to diplomatic context. For instance, Singapore suspended exercises with the PLA from 2011 to 2013 due to tensions over the South China Sea. Engagement with South Korea declined following Seoul’s 2016 decision to deploy the U.S. THAAD missile defense system. Australia exemplifies this dynamic: bilateral exercises grew steadily from 2012 to 2019 as Canberra sought to balance ties with the United States and economic links with China, but halted in 2020 amid tensions over COVID-19 origins and the launch of AUKUS. Although ties tentatively resumed in 2024–25, a provocative Chinese live-fire exercise off Australia’s coast quickly undermined progress. China’s closest military exercise partner is Russia, which accounts for 27 percent of the PLA’s combat and combat-support drills. Their cooperation has deepened since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, with 63 percent of joint activities occurring in the past 11 years. Exercises like Vostok 2018 and Joint Sea are used to enhance interoperability and signal strategic alignment. Russia is also reportedly training Chinese military personnel on lessons learned from its war against Ukraine. Nonetheless, the relationship remains one of pragmatic convergence and a partnership of convenience rather than a formal alliance. As PLA capabilities expand, China increasingly leverages military diplomacy to support its strategic objectives – shaping regional security dynamics, signaling political intentions, and building relationships for long-term operational benefits. Yet the practical returns remain limited due to rigid political control, emphasis on form over substance, lack of focus on building partner capacity, and reluctance to build real interoperability. Given this reality, U.S. conversations with allies and partners about their engagements with the PLA should focus narrowly on managing risks: preventing transfers of sensitive technologies, limiting PLA opportunities to learn military tactics, techniques, and procedures, and reinforcing the United States’ comparative advantage in building partner capacity. The goal should not be to halt Chinese military diplomacy outright, but to mitigate the potential threats it poses. Thanks to CSCMA Research Intern Raina Nelson for assistance in preparing this article.