From the Bench: No letter, no problem

From the Bench: No letter, no problem

Article 460 of the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure stipulates that before filing a court case against the government, any constitutional authority (excluding the Electoral Commission), or a public official acting in an official capacity, a judicial letter or protest must be served on that entity or person, clearly outlining the claimant’s claim or demand. A minimum of ten days must then elapse before proceedings may commence. Courts had for a long time held that should an individual fail to observe this provision of the law and instead immediately file a case in court, the proceedings would have to be considered null and void. In recent years, the courts have started to temper this strict interpretation of the law. The recent judgment of Oliver Ruggier vs the Planning Authority, delivered on 7th April 2025, saw the Court of Appeal once again adopt a more flexible interpretation of this procedural requirement. The court held that failure to serve such a judicial letter does not automatically render the proceedings null, particularly when the authority concerned was already aware of the underlying complaint. The court, presided by Chief Justice Mark Chetcuti, Mr Justice Giannino Caruana Demajo, and Mr Justice Anthony Ellul, referred to a plethora of local case law illustrating the evolving interpretation of Article 460 over time. The facts of the case The plaintiff submitted an application for a development permit with the Planning Authority in 1996. The application was ultimately rejected in 2007. Ruggier lodged appeals before both the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal and the Court of Appeal. In both cases, his claims were yet again dismissed. Subsequently, he initiated the current proceedings in 2014, without first sending a judicial letter or protest to the PA. The defendant Authority therefore claimed the nullity of the proceedings due to non-compliance with article 460. The First Hall of the Civil Court, in 2016, upheld the Authority’s preliminary plea and declared the application instituting the proceedings and consequently the ensuing proceedings, null. The plaintiff appealed this judgment on two grounds. Firstly, he argued that the First Court had erred in its interpretation of Article 460. He maintained that the purpose of this provision is to ensure that the relevant authority is made aware of the plaintiff’s claim, thereby allowing it a reasonable opportunity to address the matter. According to Ruggier, this purpose had already been fulfilled, as the Authority was fully aware of his claim due to the previous legal proceedings and it had had ample time to remedy the situation, yet it failed to do so. Ruggier’s second ground of appeal was based on the argument that the lower court’s decision was disproportionate. He claimed that his failure to send a judicial letter or formal protest before filing the case had no real negative impact—no one was disadvantaged or prejudiced by this omission. As a result, he argued, declaring the entire case null on such a technicality was an excessive and unfair response. The observations of the Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal noted that, in the past, Article 460 was interpreted in a particularly rigid, strict, and extreme manner for several reasons. First, if the requirements of the article were not adhered to, the application initiating the proceedings would automatically be considered invalid. Previous judgments had established that without first notifying the government through a judicial letter or protest, the application itself was void, and the court registrar should not have even accepted it in the first place. Secondly, every subsequent judicial act filed following the application would likewise be considered null. Third, this type of nullity was considered so absolute that it did not only apply to the government—it extended to other respondents, if any, involved in the case, even if they were not legally entitled to the same privilege in virtue of Article 460. Fourthly, this procedural privilege in favour of the government was not only considered as one of public order which could be raised by the court itself, but it could not even be renounced to by the Government. After thoroughly examining previous case-law, the court acknowledged that Maltese courts have since moved away from the strict interpretation of Article 460 and now adopt a more flexible, balanced approach guided by the principle of proportionality. This shift aligns with the fundamental right to a fair hearing, which includes the right of individuals to access the courts. The court emphasised that the true purpose of Article 460 is to give the government a fair chance to resolve or address a complaint once it has been formally notified—through a judicial letter or protest clearly outlining the claimant’s demand. The court also pointed to past rulings that draw a clear distinction between two types of situations: cases where the government was not formally notified but was still aware of the issue, and cases where it was neither notified nor aware. The court stressed that if the government—or in this case the PA—was already aware of the claim before the case was filed, then sending a judicial letter or formal protest would serve no practical purpose. The outcome would remain unchanged, even if that procedural step had been followed. Based on the facts presented, the court found that the Authority had been aware of the plaintiff’s claim as far back as 2007—seven years before the current legal proceedings were actually started. The court went on to state that in such circumstances, it would be neither fair nor reasonable to declare the plaintiff’s application invalid simply due to a technical oversight. It noted that the failure to send a judicial letter or protest did not cause any prejudice to the Government or the PA, and was purely a formalistic one. In its final assessment, the court concluded that even if the plaintiff had followed Article 460 to the letter and sent the required notice, the situation would not have changed. Taking all these factors into account, the Court of Appeal ruled that the original decision by the lower court was disproportionate, particularly when considering the actual purpose behind the legal requirement. As a result, the Court of Appeal overturned the earlier judgment and sent the case back to the First Hall of the Civil Court so that it could continue to be heard on its merits. This judgment is final and cannot be appealed from. Dr Arthur Azzopardi is managing partner, and Alizée Micallef, aralegal at AB&A Advocates.

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